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Abstract
It has been widely acknowledged that the
choice of Japanese demonstratives (the distal
a-series, the medial so-series, and the prox-
imal ko-series) in their anaphoric use is reg-
ulated by the rules concerned with the inter-
locutors’ knowledge of the referent. In cross-
linguistic discussions of anaphoric demon-
stratives, on the other hand, the effect of
the interlocutors’ knowledge of the referent
has not received such recognition. This pa-
per has the following goals. First, it criti-
cally reviews Susumu Kuno’s seminal analy-
sis of Japanese anaphoric demonstratives, and
presents a modified version of it. Second, it
argues that the interlocutors’ knowledge of the
referent is relevant to the choice of the English
demonstratives this and that too. Third, it pro-
vides a formal semantic analysis of anaphoric
demonstratives in the two languages.
1 Introduction
Since Kuno (1973), it has been widely acknowl-
edged in Japanese linguistics that the choice of
demonstratives (the distal a-series, the medial so-
series, and the proximal ko-series) in their anaphoric
use is regulated by the rules concerned with the
speaker’s and the hearer’s knowledge of the referent.
In cross-linguistic discussions of anaphoric demon-
stratives (e.g., Diessel, 1999), on the other hand, the
effect of the interlocutors’ knowledge of the referent
has not received such recognition.
The purpose of the current work is three-fold.
First, it critically reviews Kuno’s seminal analysis
of Japanese anaphoric demonstratives, and presents
a modified version of it. Second, it argues that
the interlocutors’ knowledge of the referent is rel-
evant to the choice of the English demonstratives
this and that too. Third, it provides a formal seman-
tic analysis of anaphoric demonstratives in the two
languages couched in the Discourse Representation
Theory (DRT) framework.
It should be noted, before we proceed, that our
discussion will focus on usage of anaphoric demon-
stratives in typical, two-agent conversations (dia-
logue); the question of whether and how the pre-
sented analysis can be extended to other discourse
types, such as soliloquy (monologue) and nonfic-
tional prose, will be left open. Also, our discussion
will not cover the cases of demonstratives that do not
refer to a specific entity (e.g., the “donkey anaphora”
case, as in: If a man is in Rhodes, that man cannot
be in Athens).
2 Distinct Uses of Demonstratives
Demonstratives in many, if not all, languages have
several distinct uses. We adopt Diessel’s (1999)
classification and terminology, where the uses of
demonstratives are first divided into the exophoric
and endophoric uses, and the latter is further divided
into subtypes including the anaphoric use.
The exophoric use is widely thought to be the
most basic. Exophoric demonstratives (or expres-
sions containing them) refer to entities present in the
discourse situation.1
1For the sake of simplicity, we will say “adnominal demon-
strative X refers to Y” to mean “an NP modified by X refers to
Y”. For example, this in I read this book will be said to refer to
a book, although more precisely it is the NP this book that does
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Anaphoric demonstratives, on the other hand, are
coreferential with a noun phrase in the preceding
discourse and keep track of the referents already in-
troduced to the discourse (and are not present in the
discourse situation), as in (1).
(1) My neighbor has a dog, and {this/that} dog
kept me awake. (Gundel et al., 1993: 279)
Anaphoric demonstratives must be distinguished
from recognitional and discourse-deictic demon-
stratives, two other major types of endophoric
demonstratives. A recognitional demonstrative does
not have an antecedent in the surrounding discourse
and refers to an entity that is “discourse-new” but is
identifiable for both interlocutors by virtue of their
shared knowledge (e.g., Do you still have that radio
that your aunt gave you for your birthday?; Diessel,
1999: 7). A discourse-deictic demonstrative refers
to a proposition expressed by, or a speech act carried
out by, a chunk (clause, sentence, etc.) of the sur-
rounding discourse (e.g., John is not here. — That’s
{false/a lie}.)
3 Anaphoric Demonstratives in Japanese
3.1 Kuno (1973) on Anaphoric Demonstratives
Japanese has a three-term system of demonstra-
tives, which consists of (i) the proximal ko-series
(“close to the speaker”), (ii) the medial so-series
(“close to the hearer and distant from the speaker”),
and (iii) the distal a-series (“distant from both”).
Each series contains several forms with different
syntactic categories and meanings, e.g., pronouns
kore/sore/are ‘this/that one (insentient)’, adnominal
modifiers kono/sono/ano ‘this/that’, and manner ad-
verbs koo/soo/aa ‘in this/that way’.
There has been a vast amount of literature on
anaphoric demonstratives in Japanese. Among the
numerous existing studies, the chapter titled “the
anaphoric use of kore, sore, and are” in Kuno (1973)
has been one of the most influential. Regarding the
contrast between the a-series and so-series, he es-
sentially claims that the a-series is used to refer to
an entity that both S (the speaker) and H (the hearer)
know personally (know well, are acquainted with),
and the so-series is used to refer to an entity that ei-
ther S or H does not know personally (does not know
so.
well, is not acquainted with). In accordance with
these generalizations, in (2) an a-demonstrative is
chosen to refer to a person that both S and H are ac-
quainted with, and in (3) a so-demonstrative is used
to refer to an individual that only one of the inter-
locutors (i.e., A) “knows personally”.2
(2) A: Kinoo
yesterday
Yamada-san-ni
Y.-Suffix-Dat
hajimete
for.the.first.time
aimashita.
meet.Pst.Plt
{Ano/*sono}
{thata/thatso}
hito,
person
zuibun
quite
kawatta
strange
hito-desu-ne.
person-Cop.Prs.Plt-DP
‘I met Yamada for the first time yesterday.
Thata man is a very strange person, isn’t he?’
B: Ee,
yes
{Ano/*sono}
{thata/thatso}
hito-wa
person-Top
henjin-desu-yo.
eccentric-Cop.Prs.Plt-DP
‘Yes, thata man is an eccentric.’
(adapted from Kuno, 1973: 283–284)
(3) A: Watashi-no
I-Gen
kinjo-ni
neighborhood-Dat
Yamada-san-toiu
Y.-Suffix-called
hito-ga
person-Nom
sundeimasu.
live.Ipfv.Prs.Plt
{*Ano/sono}
{thata/thatso}
hito-wa
person-Top
Porsche-o
P.-Acc
motteimasu.
own.Ipfv.Prs.Plt
‘I have a neighbor called Yamada. Heso owns
a Porsche.’
B: {*Ano/sono}
{thata/thatso}
hito
person
kanemochi-na-ndesu-ne.
wealthy-Cop.Attr-DAux.Prs.Plt-DP
‘So heso is wealthy, I suppose?’
As for anaphoric ko-demonstratives, which are ex-
emplified in (4), Kuno states that their referent must
be something that S knows well but H does not, and
2The abbreviations in glosses are: Acc = accusative, Attr =
attributive, Cl= classifier, Cop = copula, Dat = dative, DAux
= discourse auxiliary, DP = discourse particle, Evid = eviden-
tial particle, Inf = infinitive, Ipfv = imperfective, Loc = locative,
Neg = negation, Nom = nominative, Plt = polite, Pot = potential,
Prs = present, Pst = past, Top = topic, Vol = volitional. Subscript
ko, so, and a in the glosses/translations indicate that the corre-
sponding Japanese expression is a ko-, so-, and a-demonstrative,
respectively.
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also point out that they add an emotional overtone to
the utterance.3
(4) Boku-no
I-Gen
tomadachi-ni
friend-Dat
Yamada-toiu
Y.-called
hito-ga
person-Nom
iru-nda-ga,
exist.Prs-DAux.Prs-and
{kono/sono/*ano}
{thisko/thatso/thata}
otoko-wa
man-Top
nakanaka-no
considerable
rironka-de
theoretician-Cop.Inf
. . .
‘I have a friend by the name of Yamada, and
{thisko/thatso} man is a theoretician of some
caliber, and . . .’
(adapted from Kuno, 1973: 288)
3.2 Reconsideration of Kuno’s Generalizations
While Kuno’s analysis reviewed above captures well
the way anaphoric ko/so/a-demonstratives contrast
with each other, it leaves some room for refinements
and elaborations. In the following, we address the
following issues and present a modified version of
Kuno’s generalizations.
(5) i. It can be shown that it is not “to know
well/personally”, but a weaker kind of cog-
nitive relation (between an interlocutor and
a referent) that affects the choice of the
Japanese anaphoric demonstratives.
ii. Kuno does not explicitly discuss cases where
neither S nor H knows (well) the referent.
iii. There are cases where a so-demonstrative
is chosen despite its referent being known
(well) to both S and H.
Our discussion here will have to be brief due to
space limitation; see Oshima (2014) and Oshima
and McCready (in prepartion) for a fuller presenta-
tion and discussion of additional complications.4
3It is interesting to observe that ko-demonstratives of this
kind have similarity with so-called “emotional-decitic” or “af-
fective” demonstratives in English (Lakoff, 1974; e.g., This
Henry Kissinger really is something!). A notable differ-
ence, however, is that this and that in their affective use tend
not to have an explicit antecedent while an anaphoric ko-
demonstrative needs one.
4The additional complications are mainly concerned with
the use of an a-demonstrative for reference to an entity that H is
not familiar with. It is observed in so-called pseudo-soliloquy
(a type of speech that constitutes part of dialogue and yet is pre-
The borderline between “known” and “not
known”: The choice of Japanese anaphoric demon-
stratives largely hinges on the interlocutors’ knowl-
edge of the referent. Exactly what kind of knowl-
edge matters, however, is a question that requires
careful consideration.
To begin with clear-cut cases, entities such as
one’s close friends, personal items that one uses day-
to-day, and places that one often visits will be the
central cases of referents that are “known (well)”.
Also, as pointed out by Kuno (1973: 285), public
figures (e.g., film actors, politicians) that one knows
of through public media (e.g., magazines, TV) have
a good potential to be treated as, or as if they were,
“known (well)”, as long as the choice of anaphoric
demonstratives is concerned. A referent that an in-
terlocutor came to know through hearsay (including
the other interlocutor’s previous utterances), on the
other hand, is not regarded as “known (well)”, so
that reference to it is made with a so-demonstrative,
as in (3B) above.
According to Kuno, entities that an interlocutor
had only a casual encounter with and does not know
well (e.g., a person that he met briefly on the street)
constitute a borderline case, and it is possible for
him (or his conversation partner) to refer to them
with the so-series.5 This claim is hard to maintain,
however, in view of data like the following:
(6) (A and B go to the cinema together. During the
movie, they hear the person sitting behind them
sob loudly. After leaving the theater, they talk
about this person.)
A: Ushiro-no
back-Gen
hito
person
naiteta-yone.
cry.Ipfv.Pst-DP
‘The person sitting behind us was sobbing,
wasn’t he?’
B: {Ano/*sono}
{thata/thatso}
hito-no
person-Gen
sei-de
cause-by
eiga-ni
movie-Dat
shuuchuu-dekinakatta-yo.
concentrate-do.Pot.Neg.Pst-DP
‘I couldn’t concentrate on the movie because
sented as if it were part of monologue), as well as in a discourse
situation where (i) it is assumed that H is looking for an entity
with some property P (e.g., a good piano instructor), and (ii) S
introduces such an entity to H.
5See Oshima (2014: 9–10) and Oshima and McCready
(in preparation) for discussion of the data which led Kuno —
wrongly, in our view — to this conclusion.
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of thata person.’
Unacceptability of sono in (6B) shows that, con-
tra Kuno, any kind of contact involving direct per-
ception, even if it is as casual/slight as just hear-
ing sobbing noise, implies that the referent is in
the realm of “known (well)”. Henceforth, we will
use the term “recognize”, in place of Kuno’s “know
well/personally”, to refer to the relation that may
hold between an interlocutor and a referent and
that affects the choice between the three series of
Japanese anaphoric demonstratives. Along with
close friends and some public figures, entities that
one has had some kind of perceptual contact with
belong to the domain of “recognized”.
Reference to an entity that neither S nor H recog-
nizes: Taken literally, Kuno’s generalizations (with
an amendment on the relevant cognitive relation)
predict that the so-series and not the other two series
can be used to refer to an entity that neither S nor
H recognizes. This is because that “neither S nor H
recognizes the referent” logically entails that “either
S or H does not recognize the referent” (where “or”
is understood to be inclusive). This prediction needs
to be empirically tested, however, because the data
discussed by Kuno do not preclude the possibility
that the so-series can be used only when one of the
interlocutors knows well the referent and the other
does not (cf. the discussion of English this in §4).
Data like the following show, however, that
Kuno’s generalizations deal well with the situa-
tion where “neither S nor H recognizes the refer-
ent”. Such a referent can be referred to with a so-
demonstrative, but not with a ko- or a-demonstrative.
(7) (A and B are helping with the organization of
an academic conference as research assistants.
They were told that another research assistant
would join them in the afternoon, but they are
not acquainted with him.)
A: Ato-de
later
moo
more
hitori
one.Cl
kuru-yone.
come.Prs-DP
Kono
this
shigoto-wa
task-Top
{sono/*ano/*kono}
{thatso/thata/thisko}
hito-ni
person-Dat
tanomoo.
ask.Vol
‘Another person will come in the afternoon,
right? Let’s ask thatso person to do this task.’
B: {Sono/*ano/*kono}
{thatso/thata/thisko}
hito-ga
person-Nom
kuru-no-wa
come.Prs-Pro-Top
nan-ji-da-kke?
what-o’clock-Cop.Prs-DP
‘What time is thatso person supposed to
come, again?’
Reference to an entity that (i) both S and H rec-
ognize but (ii) H does not know S recognizes: The
use of the so-demonstrative in (8B) does not con-
form to Kuno’s analysis (the use of ano in this place
is possible, but seems to be slightly less natural than
that of sono).
(8) (A comes to visit B’s home.)
A: Ekimae-de
station.front-Loc
keeki-o
cake-Acc
katta-nda-kedo,
buy.Pst-DAux.Prs-and
sono
that
mise-no
shop-Gen
tenchoo-san,
manager-Suffix
sugoku
very
omoshiroi
interesting.Prs
hito-datta-yo.
person-Cop.Pst-DP
Sono
that
hito,
person
wakai
young.Prs
koro,
time
Paris-de
P.-Loc
okashi
confectionary
zukuri-no
making-Gen
shugyoo-o
training-Acc
shita-nda-tte.
do.Pst-DAux.Prs-Evid
‘I bought some cake near the station. The
manager of the cake shop was an interesting
person. He told me that he received his train-
ing as a confectioner in Paris in his youth.’
B: {Sono/(?)ano}
{thatso/thata}
hito,
person
watashi-no
I-Gen
osananajimi-de,
childhood.friend-Cop.Inf
ima-demo,
now-even
yoku
often
issho-ni
together
tsuri-ni
fishing-Dat
ittari
go.Representative
suru-ndesu-yo.
do.Prs-DAux.Prs.Plt-DP
‘He is a childhood friend of mine. We still
hang out often, and do such things as going
fishing together.’
At the time (8B) is uttered, (interlocutor B knows
that) the cake shop manager is recognized by both A
and B, and thus, if Kuno’s analysis is taken at face
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value, the use of the so-series must be blocked. Such
data suggest that the choice between the three series
of anaphoric demonstratives hinges not on whether
(S knows that) the referent is recognized by S and H,
but rather on whether it is presupposed (i.e., is con-
sidered a mutual knowledge of the interlocutors) in
the discourse situation that the referent is recognized
by both S and H.
Taking into consideration the points made above,
we put forth the following generalizations:
(9) i. The a-series can be used only if it is presup-
posed that both S and H recognize the refer-
ent.
ii. The so-series can be used only if it is presup-
posed that either S or H does not recognize
the referent.
iii. The ko-series can be used only if it is pre-
supposed that S recognizes the referent and
H does not.
The (somewhat degraded) acceptability of the a-
demonstrative in (8B) can be accounted for in terms
of pragmatic accommodation. Upon hearing the use
of ano hito in (8B), interlocutor A will quickly up-
date the common ground — the collection of mutual
knowledge of the discourse participants — adding to
it the information that interlocutor B recognizes the
referent.
4 Anaphoric Demonstratives in English
English has a two-term system of demonstratives,
consisting of proximal this (and these) and distal
that (and those). These forms can be used as a
pronominal (nominal head), a nominal determiner,
or a degree adverb (e.g., this big, that expensive).
This and that used anaphorically are often inter-
changeable, but sometimes they are not. Lakoff
(1974: 350) remarks that this has a more colloquial
tone than that, and suggests that the former is not
permissible in (10a) for this reason.
(10) a. John likes to kick puppies. {That/*this}
man’s gonna get his one of these days!
b. John likes to kick puppies. {That/this}
man has been under surveillance by the
SPCA for 5 years now.
It is possible to find, however, instances of anaphoric
this occurring in colloquial discourse.
(11) I’ve got a new roommate. I’ll ask this guy if
he’d be interested in buying your heap.
Gundel et al. (1993: 279) present another case,
namely (12), where that cannot be replaced with
this.
(12) A: Have you seen the neighbor’s dog?
B: Yes, and {that/*this} dog kept me awake
last night.
They claim that anaphoric this is subject to the
“speaker-activation” constraint, i.e., its referent must
be something introduced to the discourse by S, as in
(1) and (11), rather than by H.
An alternative way to account for the contrast be-
tween (1) and (12) is to suppose that this is subject
to some constraint related to the interlocutors’ mu-
tual knowledge, so that it, like Japanese so- and ko-
demonstratives, cannot be used to refer to an entity
that (it is presupposed that) both S and H recognize
(note that interlocutor A of (12), but not the hearer
of (1), is assumed to recognize the dog in question).
This line of analysis seems to be applicable to the
contrast between (10a) and (10b) as well. When one
interprets discourse segment (10a) in isolation, it is
most natural to presume that John is a mutual ac-
quaintance of S and H. (10b), on the other hand, may
be taken more easily to be an utterance where S de-
scribes some malicious person previously unknown
to H.
It is furthermore possible to find evidence against
the “speaker-activation”-based account. The follow-
ing discourse segments show that this sometimes can
be used to refer to a “hearer-activated” entity.
(13) A: John has a pet tortoise.
B: Oh really? How big is {that/this} tortoise?
(14) A:My neighbor downstairs asked me if I’d be
interested in buying opium.
B: You should tell the police about {that/this}
guy.
There are also cases where S has to choose that,
rather than this, to refer to a speaker-activated en-
tity. (10a) above is one such case, and (15) is an
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additional example.
(15) (Both S and H have driven Mary’s Corolla sev-
eral times.)
Mary decided to sell her Corolla. {That/*this}
car is now 20 years old, and she’s had it with
all the maintenance problems it causes.
It seems thus that the “mutual knowledge”-based
account is the more appropriate. What exactly,
then, is the discourse-configurational constraint that
this is subject to? As has been seen above with
(13)/(14), unlike a ko-demonstrative, and like a so-
demonstrative, this may be used to refer to an entity
that H recognizes but S does not. This differs from a
so-demonstrative, however, in that it cannot be used
to refer to an entity that neither S nor H recognizes.
Compare (7) with (16).
(16) (the same situation as in (7))
A: Another assistant will join us in the after-
noon, right? Let’s ask {that/*this} guy to
do this task.
B: What time is {that/*this} guy supposed to
come, again?
It can thus be concluded that the constraint on
anaphoric this involves exclusive “or”: the refer-
ent needs to be recognized by S or H, but not by
both. To put it differently, this signals informational
asymmetry between S and H regarding the refer-
ent. Anaphoric that, on the other hand, is free from
any kind of constraint that has to do with the inter-
locutors’ mutual knowledge. In more precise terms,
these properties of this/that can be stated as follows:
(17) i. This can be used only if it is presupposed
that S or H, but not both, recognizes the ref-
erent.
ii. That can be used whether or not it is pre-
supposed that S and/or H recognize the ref-
erent.
From (17a,b), it follows that it is generally possible
to replace anaphoric this with anaphoric that, but not
vice versa.
5 Formal Analysis
This section formalizes the preceding discussion.
There are many ways in which this project could be
carried out; but given that our domain of inquiry is
anaphoric demonstratives, it seems natural to make
use of a theory of semantics formulated at the level
at which discourse anaphora takes place. Conse-
quently, in this paper, we will use Discourse Rep-
resentation Theory (DRT; Kamp and Reyle, 1993;
Kamp et al., 2011) as the framework for our discus-
sion.
5.1 Preliminaries
In the interest of space, we will assume the reader’s
familiarity with the basic components of DRT de-
tailed in Kamp and Reyle (1993). For a brief re-
minder, in DRT, each (informative) sentence in a dis-
course introduces conditions and possibly discourse
referents into a Discourse Representation Structure
(DRS) in a form specified by a construction al-
gorithm. Discourse referents are similar to logi-
cal variables, and serve as markers for entities as-
serted to exist within the discourse. A DRS K can
be represented set-theoretically as an ordered pair
⟨UK , CK⟩, where UK is the set of discourse refer-
ents (the universe of the DRS) and CK is the set of
conditions that are predicated of the discourse refer-
ents. However, DRSs are usually represented using
a box notation for readability. For instance, the DRS
for A wolf howled looks as follows:
(18)
x
wolf(x)
howled(x)
In the sequel, we will use DRef for the set of dis-
course referents and Cond for the set of conditions
associated with a DRS.
In addition to the above, we need three more in-
gredients for the purposes of this paper: (i) a model
for attitude ascriptions, (ii) a model for analyzing
acquaintance with the particular objects the embed-
ding function relates to discourse referents, and (iii)
a model of presupposition. The second is obviously
needed in order to characterize the kind of cogni-
tive relation we have claimed to be necessary for the
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use of some anaphoric demonstratives; the first is re-
quired to specify the desired notion of establishment
of such acquaintance relations. We will now show
how these elements are realized in DRT, in some de-
tail since they will be key in our analysis. Finally,
our formal analysis will treat the felicity conditions
on anaphoric demonstratives in a way parallel to the
treatment of other kinds of felicity conditions in the
literature: as presuppositions (e.g. the treatment of
φ-features in Kamp et al. 2011).
In recent versions of DRT, attitude ascriptions are
modeled as attitudinal predicates which relate three
elements: attitude holders, discourse representation
structures (DRSs) K, and a function which maps
(subsets of) DRef directly to objects in the model,
and thus have the form Att(a,ADS,EA) for agent
a, a so-called ‘Attitude Description Set’ ADS, and
external anchoring function EA. The attitudinal
predicate specifies that an attitude ascription is be-
ing made. The first argument is the attitude holder.
The second argument, the ADS, specifies the con-
tent of the attitudes being ascribed. It consists of
a set of pairs ⟨Mode,K⟩, where Mode is an atti-
tude specification which can be drawn from (at least)
BEL(ief), DES(ire), and INT (end), and K is a
DRS. It is also possible here to have conditions of
the form ⟨[Anch, x],K⟩, which specify that x as
used in K is believed by the attitude holder to be
anchored to some external object. Only BEL will
play a role in our analysis. Finally, EA is a function
which maps some subset of the discourse referents
used in the conditions in the ADS to objects exter-
nal to the discourse representation, i.e., to objects
whose existence is independently known, or which
are taken to be so.6
Our final task before proceeding to the analy-
sis proper is to give background on treatments of
presupposition within DRT. There is a large litera-
ture on this topic within DRT and dynamic seman-
tics in general, with authors proposing varied treat-
ments, but here we will present a treatment within
more or less standard DRT following van der Sandt
(1992), though differing from that work in some is-
sues of representational detail. The basic idea of
DRT views of presupposition is that presuppositions
6The model theory of these conditions is complex and its
full explanation is beyond the immediate requirements of this
paper. Full details can be found in Kamp et al. (2011).
are anaphoric objects which target elements already
existing in DRSs by virtue of previous linguistic or
nonlinguistic content. For an example of the intu-
ition behind this approach, note that the presupposi-
tion of the possessive NP— that John has a daughter
— is licensed in the discourse in (19) by virtue of the
content of the first sentence.
(19) John has a daughter and a son. His daughter is
going to a good university next year.
Within DRT, this can be modeled by letting presup-
positional expressions introduce special DRSs of the
form ∂K. Such expressions are not integrated with
the rest of the DRS, instead being resolved to other
preexisting elements in the DRS. The discourse in
(19), for instance, gets the representation in (20).
The condition z =? indicates that z must be resolved
to some contextual entity, if such resolution is pos-
sible.
(20)
j x y
daughter(x, j)
son(y, j)
∂
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
z
daughter(z, j)
gtgu(z)
z =?
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
A resolution algorithm then searches for an an-
tecedent condition with the same content as the
presuppositional DRS modulo substitution of vari-
ables.7 After such resolution, modeled by letting
the unresolved variable ? in the condition z =? take
on the value x, the presuppositional content is inte-
grated; in a case like this one, where an antecedent
expression exists, it is eliminated from the represen-
tation. However, if no suitable antecedent exists, the
presupposed content is added to the DRS via accom-
modation when doing so does not result in inconsis-
tency. This process is illustrated in the variant of the
above in (21).
7This is a minor simplification; see van der Sandt (1992) and
Beaver (1997) for a detailed discussion.
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(21) John has a family. His daughter is going to a
good university next year.
In the DRS representing this discourse, no condition
exists of the form daughter(y,j) for any variable y;
thus, the presupposition cannot be resolved. How-
ever, since it is plainly consistent with the rest of the
discourse, it can be accommodated.
It is worth mentioning finally the case of proper
names, because of their close relation to demonstra-
tives (e.g. Kaplan, 1989), though in the present paper
we will not be able to address the issue of direct ref-
erence for reasons of space. In DRT, proper names
are taken to introduce discourse referents which are
associated with the presupposition that the name it-
self holds of that referent. They are thus a species
of presuppositional indefinite. The discourse refer-
ent itself must be represented at the highest level of
the DRS, and so must be mapped to some object in
the model; it is not allowed to scope under opera-
tors such as negation. The presence of the referent
at the top level may be achieved by accommodating
the presupposition if required (cf. Beaver and Zee-
vat, 2007).
5.2 Japanese
Let us begin by reconsidering the constraints on
Japanese anaphoric demonstratives from a DRT per-
spective. It can be seen that the basic ingredients
required for a formal analysis are (i) an anchoring
function, (ii) a way to separate the anchors associ-
ated with S and H, and (iii) a way to indicate the
metalinguistic beliefs of S about the anchoring func-
tions of the S and H.
This observation can be implemented as in (23),
which provides a semantics for adnominal anaphoric
demonstratives ano/sono/kono. Here, we have
treated the constraints on these expressions as pre-
suppositional in nature. The use of an adnominal
anaphoric demonstrative introduces four things to a
DRS: (i) a new discourse referent xn, (ii) a condition
requiring the resolution of that referent, xn =?, and
two “true” presuppositions: one requiring x to sat-
isfy the predication introduced by the nominal ele-
ment, and one putting some constraint or constraints
on the belief states of S and H, namely that they
recognize, or do not recognize, the referent. We
capture this by allowing individuals to have beliefs
about each other’s internal anchors and thus, indi-
rectly, about each other’s anchoring functions. In
the sequel, we will use conditions of the form (22)
to indicate content of this kind; (22) can be read “i
believes that j takes x to be externally anchored”.
(22) Bel(i, Anch(j, x))
The above condition abbreviates the usual DRT at-
titudinal representations discussed above. We can
simplify this condition still further for our purposes
here. In conditions of the form (22), the anchoring
condition Anch(a, x) indicates that a takes x to be
externally anchored; the remainder indicates that the
attitude holder i takes a to take x to be anchored. In
all the conditions we will use below, the attitude is
claimed to be jointly held by S and H, and so part of
the common ground. Given that this part of the con-
dition is constant, we will eliminate it in our analysis
proper, simply writing Anch(j, x).
Our semantics for the Japanese anaphoric demon-
stratives can then be stated as follows, with the ad-
nominal modifiers ano/sono/kono used as the repre-
sentative cases. In (23) and hereafter, {s, h} repre-
sents the group of S and H, and so Att({s, h}, . . . )
is a kind of commonly held attitude predicate. For
the case of belief, the use of this argument indicates
common belief of S and H (cf. van Ditmarsch et al.,
2007).
(23) a. ‘ano N’ introduces a condition of the form
∂
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
x
x =?
N(x)
Anch({s, h}, x)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
b. ‘sono N’ introduces a condition of the form
∂
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
x
x =?
N(x)
¬Anch({s, h}, x)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
c. ‘kono N’ introduces a condition of the form
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∂
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
x
x =?
N(x)
¬Anch(h, x)
Anch(s, x)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
This analysis takes the conditions on demonstra-
tives to be essentially presuppositional. These con-
ditions have three parts. First, a fresh discourse ref-
erent x is introduced within the DRS corresponding
to the presupposition. This referent is then indicated
to require an antecedent by the condition x =?. The
core of the analysis comes in the remaining condi-
tion(s), which state the requirements on the anchor-
ing of the variable. In (23a), the variable associated
with the referent of an anaphoric demonstrative in
the a-series is required to be jointly believed by S
and H to be anchored for both of them.8 (23b,c)
are similar to the above except for the attitudinal re-
quirement. (23b) requires that S and H do not jointly
believe that they both have anchors for x, as required
by the conditions on the so-series, and (23c) requires
that S is jointly believed to have an anchor for the
variable, but that H is not.
The above seems to adequately capture the con-
ditions we have claimed to hold of the Japanese
anaphoric demonstratives. It should be noted that we
must assume that presupposed conditions relating to
attitudes can be resolved in the structures which are
used to represent attitudes in DRT. To our knowl-
edge, this sort of case has not been discussed in the
literature, mostly because metalinguistic conditions
of this kind involving mutual belief have not been
the focus of much work in this area. We think that
this is not problematic.
5.3 English
The English case, summarized in (17) above, is sub-
stantially simpler than the Japanese one. Each of
the Japanese anaphoric demonstratives had a distinct
condition (or set of conditions) associated with it,
but for English we find that this-demonstratives are
relatively tightly constrained in having both nega-
tive and positive conditions (as with the ko-series in
8Of course, this requirement is satisfied if the referent is
jointly anchored.
Japanese), but that-demonstratives can be used quite
freely.
The task of giving a formal analysis for English
thus centers on the case of this-demonstratives. We
propose the following semantics for this- and that-
demonstratives; note that we focus on the (singu-
lar) pronominal case, which differs from the adnom-
inal case discussed above for Japanese in lacking
a presupposition associated with the nominal pred-
icate. The adnominal case (of this/that) is analyzed
by adding such a presupposition, while the Japanese
pronominal cases can be analyzed by removing the
presupposition that N(x) from each clause of (23).
The pronominal uses also have implications for the
animacy/sentience of their referents; for instance,
are/sore/kore in general cannot denote a sentient en-
tity, and neither can pronominal this/that (except
when they occur as the subject of be, as in: That
is his assistant.), which we model by adding a pre-
supposition that the referent is insentient.9
(24) a. ‘this’ introduces a condition of the form
∂
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
x
x =?
insentient(x)
¬Anch({s, h}, x)
Anch(s, x) ∨Anch(h, x)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
b. ‘that’ introduces a new discourse referent
x to DRef and the conditions x =? and
insentient(x) to Cond.
Given what we have done in (23) for Japanese,
the analysis of this is rather straightforward. (24a)
states that this behaves like a kind of combination
of the Japanese so-series and the ko-series demon-
stratives; like the so-series, it indicates that the ref-
erent is not jointly anchored, but like the ko-series,
it indicates that it is anchored for one discourse par-
ticipant, though it does not indicate which one. We
have treated anaphoric that-demonstratives as essen-
tially ordinary pronouns lacking anchoring restric-
tions. Both expressions presuppose that their ref-
9The interaction of animacy/sentience and the use of
pronominal demonstratives is a rather intricate matter (e.g., Stir-
ling and Huddleston 2002, 1504–1505), to which we cannot do
full justice here.
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erents are insentient. Note, though, that for both
cases, adnominal uses require an extra specification;
anaphoric demonstratives of the form this/that N
also presuppose thatN(x), just as with the Japanese
anaphoric demonstratives.
6 Conclusion
This paper has identified some difficulties with
Kuno’s (1973) analysis of the Japanese anaphoric
demonstratives in the a-, so-, and ko-series, and pre-
sented a modified version of that analysis which ac-
counts for a wider range of facts. This analysis was
stated in terms of the interlocutors’ knowledge of the
referent which the demonstrative picks up; we have
argued in addition that such knowledge is also rele-
vant to the choice of the English demonstratives this
and that. Finally, it has provided a formal seman-
tic analysis of anaphoric demonstratives in the two
languages stated in terms of pragmatic presupposi-
tions on belief states, as modeled in the DRT frame-
work. This work represents an advance on our cur-
rent knowledge of anaphoric demonstratives, both in
empirical and theoretical senses.
This work opens several avenues for future re-
search. The first is the application of the cur-
rent analysis to anaphoric demonstratives in other
languages. We have argued that epistemic condi-
tions on external anchoring constrain the choice of
demonstratives in Japanese and English, but have
not touched on other languages. The question of
whether these factors also play into demonstrative
use elsewhere is worthy of further investigation.
Second, we have been careful to limit our analy-
sis to the case of anaphoric demonstratives in dia-
logue. The constraints we have noted seem to be-
have in a subtly different manner in other discourse
genres such as monologue or reportage; also, bound-
variable uses of demonstratives also seem exempt
from them, as in the case of donkey anaphora. The
way(s) in which demonstratives are used across the
full range of genres, and how the constraints on their
use interact with constraints on other types of nom-
inal expressions, is also a useful area for later re-
search. Finally, it would be interesting to attempt
the integration of the results of this paper with com-
putational models of discourse generation and inter-
pretation.
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